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Power-law distributions are common, particularly in social physics. Here, we explore whether
power-laws might arise as a consequence of a general variational principle for stochastic processes.
We describe communities of ‘social particles’, where the cost of adding a particle to the community
is shared equally between the particle joining the cluster and the particles that are already members
of the cluster. Power-law probability distributions of community sizes arise as a natural consequence
of the maximization of entropy, subject to this ‘equal cost sharing’ rule. We also explore a general-
ization in which there is unequal sharing of the costs of joining a community. Distributions change
smoothly from exponential to power-law as a function of a sharing-inequality quantity. This work
gives an interpretation of power-law distributions in terms of shared costs.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Cw, 89.70.Cf, 05.40.-a, 89.75.Da
Power-law probability distributions are ubiquitous in
nature, especially in social systems. For example, the
fraction pk of U.S. cities with a population of k peo-
ple scales as pk ∼ k−2.37 [1–3]. Other examples of
power-law distributions include incomes [4], Internet
links [5, 6], fluctuations in stock market prices [7–9], com-
pany sizes [10], numbers of citations received by scientific
papers [11–13], and many others [3].
Exponential distributions, such as the Boltzmann dis-
tribution law, are also ubiquitous. But, whereas ex-
ponential distributions have a well-known basis in the
principles of statistical physics [14–16], it is unclear if a
similar principle underlies power-law distributions. Here,
our interest is in how power-law distributions might arise
from stochastic processes, particularly in social physics.
Our approach is based on the principle of maximum en-
tropy (MaxEnt). MaxEnt is widely used, not only in
thermal physics, but also in image analysis [17–19], draw-
ing inferences [20, 21], and in nonequilibrium statistical
mechanics [22–24]. We show here that the same prin-
ciple, with a ‘cost-sharing’ type of constraint, leads to
power-law distributions.
Clustering can be framed in terms of ‘joining
costs’. We focus on a problem of particle clustering,
which provides a convenient language for comparing peo-
ple joining cities to the statistical physics of growing col-
loids and polymers. We first describe a standard growth
mechanism, which we express in terms of the ‘joining
costs’ of a particle to a growing cluster. One particle may
stick to another, forming a cluster of size 2. Another par-
ticle may join the cluster, forming a size 3 cluster, and so
on. If there are N total particles, then the equilibrium
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of clusters of various sizes can be written as
1 + 1
 2
1 + 2
 3
... (1)
1 + (N − 1)
 N
Let nk be the number of clusters of size k at equilib-
rium,
nk = Knk−1n1 = Kk−1n1n2 · · ·nk−1, (2)
where K is an equilibrium binding constant. The prob-
ability distribution, pk, of cluster sizes is the ratio of the
number of size k clusters to the total number of clusters
of all sizes,
pk = Q
−1nk, (3)
where Q is the grand canonical partition function,
Q =
N∑
k=1
Kk−1
k−1∏
j=1
nj . (4)
Statistical physics provides an alternative language for
expressing the logarithms of populations in terms of ener-
gies, free energies or chemical potentials, which are cost-
like additive quantities. Here, we define a dimensionless
chemical-potential-like quantity, µk, that we call the join-
ing cost for a particle to join a size-k cluster,
µk ≡ ln (Knk) . (5)
Re-expressing Q in terms of these costs gives
Q =
∑
k
e−
∑k−1
j=1 µj =
∑
k
e−wk , (6)
where
wk ≡
k−1∑
j=1
µj (7)
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2is the dimensionless cost of assembling the whole cluster.
In this language, if wk is positive, the distribution will
be dominated by small clusters; if wk is negative, the
system will preferentially populate large clusters. We use
this cost language for social physics below. To proceed
further, we need to know how wk depends on k.
Independent particle clusters are exponentially
distributed. First, for illustration, we treat a standard
problem of colloid assembly or polymerization. Assume
the cost µk for a particle to join a cluster is independent
of k. Then
µk = µ
◦, (8)
where the constant µ◦ is the cost of adding one particle
to a cluster of any size. A cluster of size k requires k −
1 particle additions, so the total cost of assembling the
cluster is
wk = µ
◦ (k − 1) , (9)
and the average cost of adding a particle, taken over all
cluster sizes, is
〈w〉 ≡
∑
k
wkpk = µ
◦ (〈k〉 − 1) . (10)
To predict the probability distribution of cluster sizes,
we maximize the entropy,
S = −
∑
k
pk ln pk, (11)
subject to two constraints: (1) a fixed known value of 〈w〉
(Eq. 10) and (2) normalization (ensuring the probabilities
sum to 1), ∑
k
pk = 1. (12)
A constraint on 〈w〉 gives the extremum function
〈w〉 − S = µ◦
∑
k
(k − 1)pk +
∑
k
pk ln pk, (13)
so that the optimization condition is∑
k
dp∗k
[
ln p∗k + 1 + α+ µ
◦ (k − 1) ] = 0, (14)
where α and µ◦ are the Lagrange multipliers that enforce
normalization and constraint 10, respectively. Solving
Eq. 14 gives the equilibrium probability distribution, p∗k,
which maximizes the entropy and satisfies the average
cost and normalization constraints. The solution is the
standard exponential distribution of cluster sizes,
p∗k = e
−1−αe−µ
◦(k−1) = Q−1 e−µ
◦k, (15)
where Q is the grand canonical partition function,
Q =
N∑
k=1
e−µ
◦k =
1− e−µ◦N
1− e−µ◦ . (16)
Equal cost sharing leads to power-law distri-
butions. Now, we consider a more general notion of a
particle’s joining cost when it enters a k-mer cluster. A
person is more likely to join a larger city than a smaller
city because of greater opportunities of jobs, infrastruc-
ture, services, entertainment, and other economic and
social factors. Existing citizens have already paid some
of the cost of entry for the new joiner ‘particle’. So, rela-
tive to the cost of joining an independent-particle cluster
(µ◦), the cost µk of joining a ‘social-particle’ cluster of
size k is reduced to
µk = µ
◦ − krk. (17)
Eq. 17 expresses the idea of cost sharing, namely that the
cost of joining a cluster is reduced because the existing
k member particles provide a discount of rk each to the
joiner particle.
There are two non-arbitrary limiting cases for how we
might choose the value of rk: (1) No sharing, rk = 0,
and the particles are independent, as described above, or
(2) Equal sharing, where each member pays the same
amount as the joiner when it enters the cluster,
rk = µk. (18)
Substituting Eq. 18 into 17 and solving for µk yields
µk =
µ◦
1 + k
, (19)
which expresses how the costs diminish with cluster size
in social-particle systems. The total cost to assemble a
social cluster of k particles is
wk = µ
◦
k−1∑
j=1
1
1 + j
, (20)
which can be expressed as (see Appendix)
wk ≈ µ◦
[
ln
(
k +
1
2
)
+ γ − 1
]
, (21)
where γ = 0.5772... is Euler’s constant. The average
joining cost per particle is
〈w〉 ≈ µ◦
[〈
ln
(
k +
1
2
)〉
+ γ − 1
]
. (22)
To predict the social-particle probability distribution,
we maximize the entropy subject to constraint 22 on 〈w〉,∑
k
dp∗k
{
ln p∗k + 1 + α+ µ
◦
[
ln
(
k +
1
2
)
+ γ − 1
]}
≈ 0.
(23)
Solving for p∗k yields
p∗k ∼
(
k +
1
2
)−µ◦
, (24)
3giving a power-law distribution. The scaling exponent
µ◦ is the ‘un-discounted cost’ of adding one particle to a
cluster.1
The present work shows how power-law distributions
can emerge naturally from random clustering of particles
that equally share the joining cost. The ‘rich-get-richer’
aspect of power-law size distributions is that social parti-
cles are more attracted to bigger clusters than to smaller
clusters. We have expressed this in a language of ‘costs’:
the power-law arises because member particles equally
share the joining costs with joiner particles. The power-
law exponent is the ‘un-reduced’ cost µ◦.2
The aim of the present work is not to build a model
of a specific power-law process. We do not give here a
generative way to derive µ◦ for any particular problem of
social physics. Rather, the present treatment plays a role
more like the Boltzmann law, which is a framework for
models, rather than a particular model itself. There is a
large literature of models that generate power laws [25,
26]. We believe that, at least in some cases, such models
may be interpretable in terms of shared costs.
In many situations involving people, the idea of cost
sharing arises naturally. For example, a well-studied
power-law distribution is of the number of citations to
scientific papers [11–13]. Suppose the author of paper A
is preparing to cite paper C. Every paper in the set {B}
that has already cited paper C can be thought of as a
member of a community that paper A is about to join.
The larger is the community {B}, the more likely it is
for paper A to join that community, and cite paper C.
The community {B} has already paid a higher cost by
finding paper C in sea of options that was larger at the
time. In this way, any paper B has lowered the cost for
the author of paper A to find and cite paper C.
The distribution of U.S. city sizes also has a power-
law tail [1, 2]. It is more likely a person will choose to
move to Los Angeles, CA (population: 9 million) than
to Fields, Oregon (population: 86). Similar to the cost
amortization obtained through an economy of scale, the
people of LA have already paid the development costs of
creating the companies, jobs, infrastructure, and services
that attract new individuals. Thus, the marginal cost of
adding one more person is reduced, relative to the cost
of adding a person to a smaller city.
A generalized model for partial cost sharing.
Described above are two limiting cases: no cost sharing
(independent particles) or full cost sharing (the members
pay the same as the joiner). What if the member particles
1 This scaling form for p∗k (24) is relatively accurate for most values
of k (k & 2). The exact forms, valid for all values of k, are given
in the Appendix.
2 Our term ‘costs’ here can alternatively be thought of in terms
of ‘economies of scale’. Making more widgets decreases the cost-
per-widget. That is, if the cost of a widget factory is µ◦, then
the cost per widget for the first widget is µ◦ and the cost per
widget for making two widgets is µ◦/2. In this sense, the cost of
the second is ‘shared’ by the first.
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FIG. 1. Probability distributions for various sharing values,
with µ◦ = 2. At s = 0.1, the particles are barely helpful
at all, and the entering particle must pay most of its joining
cost, so the distribution is nearly exponential. At s = 0.9, the
particles are very helpful, and the distribution is a power-law.
only pay a fraction s of the cost that the joiner particle
pays? Now the cost reduction is
rk = sµk. (25)
Combining Eq. 25 with Eq. 17 and solving for µk, we find
µk =
µ◦
1 + sk
, (26)
so the total cost of assembling a partially-social cluster
of size k is
wk = µ
◦
k−1∑
j=1
1
1 + sj
≈ µ
◦
s
ln
(
k +
1
s
− 1
2
)
+ const, (27)
where the constant will be absorbed into the normaliza-
tion (see Appendix). Maximizing the entropy gives
p∗k ∼
(
k +
1
s
− 1
2
)−µ◦/s
. (28)
We call s the sharing parameter: s = 0 involves no
sharing (i.e., independent particles) and s = 1 involves
full equal sharing between the joiner particle and all
members. The s parameter controls the shape of the
distribution. For s = 0, the entry cost is the same for
all clusters, and the distribution is exponential; there are
very few large clusters. For s = 1, the particles are social,
and the entry cost is reduced for larger clusters, resulting
in a power-law distribution; there are more large clusters
in this case. Fig. 1 shows that varying s changes the dis-
tribution smoothly from exponential to power-law. We
refer to the limit s → ∞ as ‘super-social particles’: the
4existing members pay the full cost, and the joiner parti-
cle pays nothing. For super-social particles, we obtain a
uniform distribution; all cluster sizes are equally proba-
ble.
We have shown how power-law distributions can arise
naturally from the maximization of entropy subject to
a symmetry relationship in which all particles share the
cost incurred when a new particle joins a cluster. It has
been noted before that MaxEnt with logarithmic con-
straints leads to power-law distributions [27, 28].3 Ex-
ponential distributions result from constraints on linear
averages such as 〈k〉, while power-law distributions result
from constraints on logarithmic averages such as 〈ln k〉.
Here, we have described how such constraints can be in-
terpreted as a type symmetry of sharing that is natural
in the social realm.
Many previous studies on generative mechanisms for
power-laws have investigated a family of ‘proportional
attachment’ (PA) rules [11, 30–32]. In the context of
particle clustering, a PA rule says that the probability
of a cluster acquiring a new particle is proportional to
the number of particles it already contains. A premise
of the PA rule is that the joining particle is cognizant of
the populations of the clusters in the system. By con-
trast, our cost-sharing framework does not assume the
particles know anything about the system, so the present
approach may be useful for modeling systems composed
of ‘uninformed’ particles.
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5APPENDIX
Approximate cost function for social particles.
Here, we derive expression 21 by including order 1/k cor-
rections from the sum-to-integral conversion of wk for so-
cial particles. We use the Euler-Maclaurin formula [33]
to convert the sum in Eq. 19 to an integral:
k−1∑
j=1
1
1 + j
= ln k +
1
2k
+ C +O (k−2) , (29)
where C is an unknown constant.
First, we calculate the asymptotic form of ln(k + a)
(for some constant a, where k  a) by Taylor expanding
around a = 0:
ln(k + a) ∼ ln k + a
k
+O (k−2) . (30)
We use 30 to absorb the 1/k term in 29 into the loga-
rithm,
ln k +
1
2k
∼ ln
(
k +
1
2
)
. (31)
Next, we evaluate the constant C. We begin by defining
the kth harmonic number,
Hk ≡
k∑
j=1
1
j
= ψ (1 + k) + γ, (32)
where ψ(k) ≡ d ln Γ(k)/dk is the digamma function, and
γ = 0.5772... is Euler’s constant. The sum in Eq. 19 can
be written
k−1∑
j=1
1
1 + j
= Hk − 1 = ψ (1 + k) + γ − 1. (33)
Ignoring the term in Eq. 33 that depends on k, we see
that the remaining constant terms are
C = γ − 1. (34)
Substituting 31 and 34 into 29, we find
k−1∑
j=1
1
1 + j
∼ ln
(
k +
1
2
)
+ γ − 1 +O (k−2) . (35)
Dropping the order 1/k2 corrections gives the expression
used in 21.
Exact distributions. In Eq. 21, we have given an
approximation to pk. Here, we use Eq. 33 to obtain the
exact expression for the probability distribution function
pk. We write the cost function wk as
wk = µ
◦
k−1∑
j=1
1
1 + j
= µ◦
[
ψ (1 + k) + γ − 1
]
. (36)
Maximizing the entropy yields
p∗k = Q
−1e−µ
◦ψ(1+k), (37)
with partition function
Q =
N∑
k=1
e−µ
◦ψ(1+k). (38)
In the more general case of partially social particles,
the cost function is
wk = µ
◦
k−1∑
j=1
1
1 + sj
=
µ◦
s
[
ψ
(
1
s
+ k
)
− ψ
(
1 +
1
s
)]
,
(39)
leading to the probability distribution
p∗k = Q
−1e−
µ◦
s ψ(
1
s+k), (40)
where
Q =
N∑
k=1
e−
µ◦
s ψ(
1
s+k). (41)
